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Abstract
The increased use of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) for geolocation has led to
the increased reliance of this technology. Jamming, protecting and detecting jamming
in a WSN are areas of study that have increased in interest because of this. To
learn more about the effects of jamming, this research uses simulations and hardware
to test the effects of jamming on a WSN. For this research the hardware jamming
was tested using a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) version 2 to assess
the effects of jamming on a cooperative network of Java Sun SPOTs. This research
combined simulations and data collected from hardware experiments to see the effects
of jamming on cooperative and non-cooperative geolocation.
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The Effects of Cognitive Jamming
on Wireless Sensor Networks used for Geolocation

I. Introduction

T

his chapter provides a brief overview of relevant background material to this
research, including the development of localization via Received Signal Strength

(RSS), jamming of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and Software Defined Radio
(SDR). The motivation and research objectives for this work are also discussed.
1.1

Background
Localization or geolocation is used for various applications and can be used

indoors and outdoors. For example, geolocation can be used to find mobile robots
indoors [20] or to find a mobile user in a cellular environment [22]. A WSN can be
used for geolocation to locate a transmitter. There are many applications for WSNs,
some examples are:
• Cellphone network (voice, text and data)
• Animal monitoring (location tracking of animals)
• Machine monitoring (sensors on equipment in manufacturing)
• Vehicle monitoring (sensors monitoring functions of racecars)
• Medical monitoring (sensors on patients in hospitals)
• Wi-Fi 802.11 networks (internet, printing, storage, etc.)
A WSN can also be a set of inexpensive sensors used to collect RSS measurements.
Java Sun SPOT sensors are used as a WSN in this research. Sun SPOT sensors can
be programmed to perform various functions including transmitting and receiving.
WSN are also prone to interference either intentional or unintentional.

1

Jamming can be unintentional interference or noise that can degrade the performance or disrupt a WSN. Jamming can also be in the form of an attack, which is
intended to disrupt a WSN. Jamming is an effective form of attack since no special
hardware is required and it is easy to monitor and broadcast in the same frequency
band as the network which is being jammed. If jamming is implemented wisely, it can
cause great harm to the network being jammed and can provide great benefits to the
attacker with minimal cost [15]. With the increase of location based services (e.g. cell
phones and Facebook Check In service) comes the increased dependence on this technology. The more we depend on this technology, the greater the adverse effects will
be when it stops working. If the WSN is disrupted or jammed, this causes problems
for the users. In addition to civilian uses of localization, the military has an increased
need for geolocation. Geolocation can be used to locate enemy transmitters, soldiers
or communication devices. The enemy can also use jammers to block or reduce the
effect of a WSN used for geolocation. This can cause problems with the military’s
use of WSN for tracking enemy transmitters or soldiers.
The main focus of this research is assessing jamming impacts on sensor networks.
There are a few effective ways to jam a WSN:
• Constant Jammer
• Deceptive Jammer
• Random Jammer
• Reactive Jammer
Each of these methods has their strengths and weaknesses, which will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter II. For this research a Constant Jammer will be used. Constant
Jamming is where the jammer is on continuously at a steady power level maintaining
a single type of waveform.
There are two different types of WSNs that are discussed in this research, Cooperative Network and Non-cooperative Network. In a Cooperative Network, the

2

Figure 1.1:
Diagram showing the difference betweet a Cooperative Network and
Non-Cooperative Network [3].
receivers communicate with each other and communicate with the transmitter. The
receivers know the transmitter’s modulation scheme and are able to decode the signal.
They are all part of the same network communicating with each other. In a NonCooperative Network the receivers still work together, but the transmitter is not part
of the network. The transmitter’s modulation scheme is generally unknown and it is
not able to be decoded. The received power is measured by taking the power spectral
density of the transmitter. Figure 1.1 shows the difference between Cooperative and
Non-Cooperative Networks [3].

3

1.2

Research Objectives
The effects of jamming a WSN used for geolocation has not been studied in

great detail. The main goal and objective of this research is to determine the effects
of jamming on the Sun SPOT devices used as a WSN for geolocation. To accomplish
this, the Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) version 2, a type of SDR, is
used as a jammer to disrupt the Sun Spot WSN. This is first simulated in MATLAB
to get a baseline on what to expect from the Sun SPOT sensors. To determine the
effect of jamming, the location estimate of the geolocation algorithm is compared in
both non-jamming (clear air) and jamming environments. A baseline is established
by collecting clear air data and performing the estimation algorithm. The same
estimation algorithm is used for the jamming environment. This allows the data from
the two environments to be compared. An existing algorithm from [16] is used for the
geolocation estimates; the algorithm is not part of the new contributions.
1.3

Motivation
There are several motivating factors that propel this research. One factor is the

increased use of WSNs in both the military and civilian sectors. Wireless networks
are the future of communications and every year the number of WSNs have been
increasing [4]. With the growth and reliance on WSNs, jamming and the effects of
jamming WSNs is becoming a topic of interest.
Another motivating factor is that the military is increasing the use of WSNs on
the battlefield. Similar to how the Global Positioning System (GPS) can be jammed,
WSNs can also be jammed [32]. Since most WSNs operate at higher received power
levels compared to GPS signals they are not as susceptible to jamming as GPS [11],
[21], but they can still be effected by jamming. The effects of jamming WSNs have
not been studied as much as GPS jamming, therefore it is crucial to understand the
effects of jamming as this technology continues to grow. As WSNs grows into the
military realm, lives may depend on the ability of WSNs operating as intended in
both clear air and jamming environments.
4

1.4

Organization
Chapter II is the background information which discusses the literature review

and key technical background research areas. This includes RSS techniques, SDR
and jamming WSN. In Chapter III, the derivations for the geolocation solution, simulation and hardware set-up details are described. Chapter IV provides the results
for the simulations hardware experiments and analyzes how the jammer effected the
geolocation solution. Finally, Chapter V gives a summary of this research as well as
the potential follow-on research areas.
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II. Background Information

T

his chapter will discuss theory and experimental results related to this research.
The review will address several main areas that are covered in this work. The

areas of research are Jamming Sensor Networks, Software Defined Radio, Wireless
Sensor Networks, Localization, Recieved Signal Strength Techniques, Detection and
Estimation, and Wireless Network Discovery.
2.1

Jamming Sensor Networks
As mentioned in the introduction Jamming of Sensor Networks is one key area

of related research. Sensor networks are widely used in many applications for data acquisition and data distribution [6]. Some examples include vehicle monitoring, animal
monitoring, cellular phone and IEEE 802.11 networks. Wireless sensor networks are
built upon a shared medium that makes it easy to interfere with or conduct jamming
on the networks [31]. These attacks can be conducted many different ways; a few
effective ways of jamming are described next.
2.1.1

Constant Jammer.

The constant jammer continually emits a radio

signal, and can be implemented using either a waveform generator that continuously
sends a radio signal or a normal wireless device that continuously sends out random
bits to the channel without following any MAC-layer etiquette [31]. Normally, the
underlying MAC protocol allows legitimate nodes to send out packets only if the
channel is idle. Thus, a constant jammer can effectively prevent legitimate traffic
sources from getting hold of a channel and sending packets [31].
2.1.2

Deceptive Jammer.

Instead of sending out random bits, the deceptive

jammer constantly injects regular packets to the channel without any gap between
subsequent packet transmissions. As a result, a normal communicator will be deceived
into believing there is a legitimate packet and be duped to remain in the receive state.
TinyOS is an open source software program used for WSN written in the nesC (similar
to C language) programming language. For example, in TinyOS, if a preamble is
6

detected, a node remains in the receive mode, regardless of whether that node has a
packet to send or not. Even if a node has packets to send, it cannot switch to the
send state because a constant stream of incoming packets will be detected [31].
2.1.3

Random Jammer.

Instead of continuously sending out a radio signal, a

random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming. Specifically, after jamming
for a while, it turns off its radio and enters a “sleeping” mode. It will resume jamming
after sleeping for some time. During its jamming phase, it can behave like either a
constant jammer or a deceptive jammer. This jammer model tries to take energy
conservation into consideration, which is especially important for those jammers that
are battery powered [31]. Another advantage of a random jammer is that they are
harder to detect since they randomly turn on and off for various amounts of time.
2.1.4

Reactive Jammer.

The three models discussed above are active jam-

mers in the sense that they try to block the channel irrespective of the traffic pattern
on the channel. Active jammers are usually effective because they keep the channel
busy all the time. An alternative approach to jamming wireless communication is to
employ a reactive strategy. The reactive jammer stays quiet when the channel is idle,
but starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it senses activity on the channel. A
few advantages of a reactive jammer are that they are more energy efficient and they
are harder to detect [31].
Of these types of jammers the constant jammer will be used in data collection
for the experiments described in section III. The USRP2, a type of SDR, will be used
to implement the jammer for the experiments.
2.1.5

Jamming Research.

There are a few areas of research going on in the

area of jamming sensor networks. Some of the work focuses on the detection and
localization of jamming. The rest of the work mainly focuses on attack and defense
strategies. In [26], a Geometry-Covering based Localization (GCL) algorithm, which
utilizes the knowledge of computing geometry, especially the convex hull is proposed.
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Simulation results showed that GCL is able to achieve higher accuracy than Centroid
Localization in most cases. It was also noted that in general, when the density of
nodes is higher, the localization error is smaller. In [2], jamming and sensing are two
related functions in physical-layer based denial of service attacks against an encrypted
wireless ad hoc network. The authors presented initial results in designing such a
layered attacker for the Transport/Network layer. They showed that jamming can
have significant gains of well over 100 when the packet type and timing of the network
are known. It was shown that highly predictable timing in the wireless network can
be exploited for easy attacks.
Optimal jamming attacks and network defense strategies are another key area of
research. In [15], the authors studied controllable jamming attacks in wireless sensor
networks, which are easy to launch and difficult to detect and difficult to locate. It
was determined when there is a lack of knowledge of the attacker by the network and
the attacker has a lack of knowledge of the network, the attacker and the network
respond optimally to the worst-case strategy of the other. In [5], the authors discussed
the problem of jamming a communication network under complete uncertainty. The
authors derived upper and lower bounds for the optimal number of jamming devices
required when they are located at the vertices of a uniform grid. They proved that
their approach was more efficient than a solution provided by covering the square
grid with circles of radius L. Even though their approach is more efficient, they still
require a large number of jammers to accomplish their task.
2.2

Software Defined Radio
SDR is a flexible architecture, which can be configured to adapt various wireless

standards, waveforms, frequency bands, bandwidths, and modes of operations [27].
There are various hardware platforms and software architectures that are used for
defining the software radios. The USRP2, Rice Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP), Berkeley Emulation Engine 3 (BEE3), Kansas University Agile Radio (KUAR), Small Form Factor Software Defined Radio (SFF-SDR) and Intelligent
8

Figure 2.1: Block Diagram of the basic components of a USRP2 showing the possible daughterboards, FPGA, ADCs, DACs and Gigabit Ethernet Controller.
Transport System (ITS) are some platforms for SDR. In [27] these systems are explained in detail. For this thesis, the USRP2 will be explained in detail.
The Universal Software Radio Peripheral 2 (USRP2) is the creation of Matt
Ettus (Ettus Research LLC) [7]. The USRP2 is a second generation of Universal
Software Radio Peripheral. Its platform is made up of a Xilinx Spartan-III Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and a general purpose AeMB processor [27].
The USRP2 is made of up a limited amount of components. Figure 2.1 shows a
block diagram of the basic configuration of the USRP2. The USRP2 has removable
daughter boards that can be swapped out depending on what frequency range the
operator intends to operate in. This makes the USRP2 a very versatile software radio
that can be configured to be virtually any type of wireless device. Some examples of
the daughter boards are the DBSRX: 800 MHz to 2.4 GHz receiver, the RFX900: 750
to 1050 MHz transceiver and the WBX: 50 MHz to 2.2 GHz transceiver. The WBX
daughterboard is shown in Figure 2.2.
On the USRP’s main board there are Analog to Digital Converters (ADCs)
and Digital to Analog Converters (DACs) along with a large FPGA. The FPGA is
optimized for Digital Signal Processing (DSP) applications and allows for processing
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Figure 2.2:

WBX Daughterboard [8].

complex waveforms at high sample rates [9]. A FPGA is like a small, massively
parallel computer that a user can program to perform any task that is required [1].
GNU Radio is a free software development toolkit that provides the signal processing runtime and processing blocks to implement software radios using readilyavailable, low-cost external Radio Frequency (RF) hardware and commodity processors. It is widely used in hobbyist, academic and commercial environments to
support wireless communications research as well as to implement real-world radio
systems [7]. The radio applications are written in Python, while the critical signal
processing components of the code are implemented in C++ using processor floating
point extensions where available [27]. In GNU Radio Python there is a library of
signal processing blocks which are used for the signal processing of the waveforms.
There is also a program called GNU Radio Companion (GRC), which has a graphical
user interface and is a tool for creating signal flow graphs and generating flow-graph
source code [27].
GNU Radio is one of the ways to control a USRP2, LabView and Simulink can
also be used to controll a USRP2. For this research Simulink will be used to control
and program the USRP2. Only Simulink in MATLAB versions 2010b and 2011a
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has the USRP2 blocks in the Communication blockset. Older versions of Simulink
cannot be used with the USRP2. The common sources and blocks in Simulink can
be connected to the USRP2 transmit or receive blocks and used to create numerous
types of devices.
2.3

Wireless Sensor Networks
A WSN generally consists of a basestation (or “gateway”) that can communicate

with a number of wireless sensors via a radio link. Data is collected at the wireless
sensor node, compressed, and transmitted to the gateway directly or, if required, uses
other wireless sensor nodes to forward data to the gateway. The transmitted data are
then presented to the system by the gateway connection [30]. The Java Sun SPOTs
can be configured to be a WSN. The Sun SPOT unit is a small, wireless, battery
powered experimental platform. It is programmed almost entirely in Java to allow
programmers to easily create projects. Before the Sun SPOT unit was available it
was a lot harder to program wireless sensors because of their special programming
language. The Sun SPOT hardware platform includes a range of built-in sensors as
well as the ability to easily interface to external devices [25].
For this research, the Sun SPOTs are configured to have one transmitter and a
various number of receivers. The network of Sun SPOT receivers reports the RSS of
the Sun SPOT transmitter to the Sun SPOT basestation. The computer connected
to the Sun SPOT basestation records the data from all the Sun SPOTs which are
configured as receivers. The collected data are then used to determine the location of
the transmitter. This is one method used for localization also known as geolocation.
In the next section localization methods will be described.
2.4

Localization
Localization in a WSN is used for many different applications. One example

of localization is the location of mobile robots indoors [20]. RSS is converted to
power in dBm, which is used to map a grid of locations using the indoor Wireless
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Local Area Network (WLAN) system. Once the building is mapped with reference
data, the RSS can be compared to the reference data and an estimated position
of the mobile robot can be calculated. This technique is called RSS fingerprinting.
Localization is also used in cell phones for Enhanced 911 (E911). The U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) requires that the precise location of all E911
callers be automatically determined [23]. By using Time of Arrival (TOA), Angle Of
Arrival (AOA), and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) algorithms, the location of
the mobile phone can be estimated.
There are several different methods that have been developed and researched
for localization. In [29], it is shown that there are four common methods used to
determine the location of sensors. They are TOA, TDOA, AOA and RSS. Each of the
methods uses a different aspect of the signal, and has advantages and disadvantages
over the other methods. These methods will be discussed briefly.
2.4.1

Time of Arrival and Time Difference of Arrival.

TOA and TDOA are

very similar types of measurements. Both measurements measure the time at which a
signal, either RF or acoustic, first arrives at a receiver [21]. Both methods do require
a precise knowledge of time and need to be synchronized in order to have accurate
results.
The measured TOA is the time of transmission plus a propagation-induced time
delay [21]. TDOA uses a slightly different method to determine the distance. TDOA
shares the arrival time with another transmitter or receiver, depending on the type
of location or navigation, and the distance is based on the difference between the two
arrival times. In general, TOA and TDOA systems are more complex compared to
RSS systems and more expensive due to the fact that they require precise timing in
order to achieve useable results. Another disadvantage is they are prone to multipath interference. Multi-path is where the signal from the transmitter is received
along with indirect signals reflected from surrounding objects. This can cause errors
and reduce the accuracy of the estimated location.
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2.4.2

Angle of Arrival.

AOA uses a sensor array and employs array signal

processing techniques at the sensor nodes to determine the direction of the arrival
of the signal [21]. This information is often used along with TDOA and RSS to
add additional information about the direction of the signal. AOA requires multiple
antenna elements, which adds to the size and cost of a device used for AOA.
AOA is only able to determine the direction of the transmitter, not the distance
to the transmitter. That is why AOA is commonly used along with either RSS or
TDOA. This could be an issue if the cost and complexity of the system is a concern.
Similar to TDOA, AOA is prone to multi-path interference.
2.4.3

Received Signal Strength.

RSS uses the power of the signal measured

at the receiver to estimate the distance to the transmitter. With multiple receivers,
the location of a transmitter can be estimated. RSS relies on the fact that in free
space the signal power decays proportional to d−2 , where d is the distance between
the transmitter and receiver [21]. If the transmitted power is known or estimated,
the distance to the transmitter from the receiver can be estimated. By increasing the
number of receivers, the location accuracy estimate of the transmitter is increased.
This method is used for this research. The main benefit of using RSS is that it is
cost effective since the sensors are simple and do not require precise timing, complex
antennas or processing.
There are some sources of error that affect the power measurements received.
Multipath signals and shadowing are two major sources of error in the measured
RSS. Multiple signals with different amplitudes and phases arrive at the receiver,
and these signals add constructively or destructively as a function of the frequency,
causing frequency-selective fading [21]. This effect can be reduced by using a spreadspectrum method (either direct-sequence or frequency hopping) which averages the
received power over a range of frequencies.
With the device using a spread-spectrum technique to reduce these types of
errors, there are still errors caused by shadowing. For example, the shadowing effect
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caused by the attenuation of a signal due to obstructions (walls, buildings, trees,
people, etc.). A signal must pass through or diffract around these obstructions on the
path between the transmitter and receiver [21]. This error is usually modeled as a
random variable.
2.5

Received Signal Strength Techniques
There are two main types of RSS localization techniques, cooperative and non-

cooperative. In [21], cooperative localization, sensors work together in a peer-topeer manner to make measurements and then form a map of the network. Various
application requirements (such as scalability, energy efficiency, and accuracy) will
influence the design of sensor localization systems. The Sun SPOT sensors used for
this research work in a similar fashion and communicate to each other as a network.
The Sun SPOT sensors are set-up as a network of receivers that communicate with
each other and communicate with the Sun SPOT that is set-up as a transmitter. The
Sun SPOT receivers know the modulation scheme and MAC address of the transmitter
and only record the energy from the de-modulated Sun SPOT transmitter.
In non-cooperative RSS localization, the receivers record the raw power from
a transmitter or multiple transmitters. The receivers do not communicate with the
transmitter and are unable to de-modulate the transmitters signal. In non-cooperative
systems, such as locating emitters in a hostile environment, the RSS may be determined by integrating the observed Power Spectral Density (PSD) [17]. However,
the observed PSD is dominated by noise at low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) values.
Thus, if the signal is low-power or far from a given receiver, the PSD may contain
little information about the location of the emitter [18].
2.6

Detection and Estimation
Detection and Estimation is another key area of interest related to this research.

All of the data collected by the sensors are relayed to a central node, the base station,
where all the data are stored. This is where the processing of the data and the deci14

sions are made by using detection and estimation. Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) is used to estimate the location of the transmitter. MLE is asymptotically
unbiased and efficient for large data sets [13]. In [16], the position is estimated along
with the transmitter’s orientation, beam width, and transmit power, as well as the
environment’s path loss exponent, using received signal strength measurements. The
derivations for how this estimator is used are included in Chapter III. The MLE of θ,
a parameter of vector P which is the received power vector, is found by:
θ̂ML = arg max L

(2.1)

L = ln p(P | θ)

(2.2)

θ

After the MLE is used to find the estimated position θ, the estimated position will be
compared with estimates that have jamming and estimates that do not have jamming.
The amount the estimates are off is the effect caused by jamming.
2.7

Wireless Network Discovery
Wireless Network Discovery (WND), refers to modeling all layers of a non-

cooperative wireless network by finding the frequency of a device, locating the device,
determining communication patterns, transmit power of the device, etc. In, [10]
observations of physical layer data are used for decisions and calculations, and are
based on just the measurements collected by the sensors. Although this information
is packaged and distributed on the network layer, only the physical measurements
are considered. This protocol is used to detect faulty nodes operating in the sensor
network. In [10], the author used WND for the localization of transmitters and
detection of sensors affecting the localization. To accomplish this, a model for faulty
sensors and two methods of detection are developed. Detection rates are analyzed
with Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, and the trade-off of detection
versus localization error is discussed. Classification between faulty sensors is also
considered to determine an appropriate response to potential network attacks.
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III. Methodology

T

his chapter details the methodology used to develop and test the algorithms
used for geolocation and jamming. The setup of the simulations of the sensor

network for cooperative and non-cooperative geolocation are explained. Following the
simulation section the hardware configuration and layout for the system will also be
shown. The various jammer configurations, antennas and power levels are discussed.
3.1

System Overview and Description
The system consists of four major components: the sensor network deployed

by the user can be either a cooperative or non-cooperative network, the basestation
used for collecting and processing data, the transmitter that is being tracked and
the jammer that is disrupting the sensor network. Figure 3.1 shows the four main
components of the system. This system is used to test and determine the effects of
jamming on a WSN used for geolocation. All of these components are needed to
understand how jamming effects a WSN, specifically the Sun SPOT sensors. In order
to understand the effects of jamming, each component of the system will be described.

3.1.1

Sensor Network.

The first component is a sensor network.

As

mentioned earlier there are two types of sensor networks, a cooperative and noncooperative sensor network. The non-cooperative sensor network is simulated in
MATLAB along with the cooperative sensor network. In hardware testing only the
cooperative sensor network is used. This network is a group of Sun SPOTs that are
able to estimate the RSS of a transmitted signal. The Sun SPOTs have knowledge of
the frequency that the transmitter is operating at. The Sun SPOTs also communicate
with each other and can send information from unit to unit back to the basestation.
The Sun SPOTs are stationary and their locations are known and stored at the basestation. This knowledge is collected either from a GPS unit that was positioned at
each unit location or from measuring the Sun SPOT network by hand. This is known
as a priori knowledge of the unit locations. This will also be simulated in MATLAB.
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Figure 3.1: System overview showing the four main components: Sun SPOT sensor
network as receivers and transmitter, the USRP2 jammer and the basestation for
collecting the data from the Sun SPOT sensor network.
The Sun SPOTs do Over-the-Air (OTA) communication between each Sun
SPOT. This allows the Sun SPOTs to form a cooperative network since the Sun
SPOTs that are set-up as receivers communicate with the Sun SPOT set-up as a transmitter. This allows the Sun SPOTs to ignore interference in the 2.4 GHz Industrial,
Scientific and Medical (ISM) band and this makes it harder to add interference to the
network. To have a cooperative network, you would need to know the IEEE extended
MAC address of each Sun SPOT. The IEEE extended MAC address is a 64-bit address,
expressed as four sets of four-digit hexadecimal numbers: nnnn.nnnn.nnnn.nnnn. The
first eight digits are always 0014.4F01. The last eight digits are device dependent and
printed on a sticker visible through the translucent plastic on the radio antenna fin.
A typical sticker would show something like 0000.77AE, implying an IEEE address
for that SPOT of 0014.4F01.0000.77AE [24].
The other type of network is a non-cooperative network. In a non-cooperative
network, the receivers do not communicate with the transmitter. The transmitter
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is a non-cooperative device that is not controlled by the user or the sensor network.
The receivers will record the raw power of the transmitter in a set frequency band to
detect the RSS of a non-cooperative transmitter. If there is interference in addition
to the transmitter, this will affect the estimation of a non-cooperative network. From
the author’s experience, this type of network is affected more by jamming. The sensor
network estimates the power of the transmitter along with the jammer reducing the
accuracy of the estimation. This network is simulated in MATLAB.
3.1.2

Basestation.

The basestation is an important part of the system. All

data from the Sun SPOT sensor network is reported back and collected here. The
data can be passed onto MATLAB for real time processing of the solution or stored
for later processing. MATLAB uses the algorithms discussed in the next section for
the estimation of the transmitter location.
3.1.3

Transmitter.

The transmitter is another important part of the system.

In the cooperative network, the Sun SPOT transmitter’s frequency and MAC address
are known. This allows the Sun SPOT network to ignore other interference in the
2.4 GHz band. In the real world, there are many unknown aspects to the device and
channel that will affect how accurately the sensor network will be able to locate the
transmitter. Some of the factors are the antenna polarization, the original transmission power, and various channel and environmental factors [10]. In [16], techniques are
shown to estimate these factors without prior knowledge of them. For this research,
these factors are considered known either from estimation or prior knowledge.
3.1.4

Jammer.

The key aspect of the system for this research effort is the

jammer. The USRP2, a type of SDR, is used as a jammer for this research. The
USRP2 is controlled by Simulink and can be configured to be a constant or random
jammer. In simulation, for the cooperative network, the jammer is simulated by
removing sensors in a designated target area. This is similar to how the hardware
jammer works since the hardware jammer increases the noise floor so that the receivers
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Figure 3.2: A four by four grid example of a cooperative sensor network containing
16 sensors with the CRLB in cyan and the Covariance in magenta of the estimate for
the 10 trials simulated.
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can’t communicate with the transmitter; this effectively removes the receiver from
the network. For the non-cooperative network the jammer is simulated by adding
another device that acts similar to another transmitter. The system is implemented
in MATLAB and an example of the sensor network is shown in Figure 3.2. Figure
3.2 shows the effects of jamming a cooperative sensor network and the error that the
jammer introduces to the estimate. This can be seen with the estimated position being
farther away than the actual position of the transmitter. Only 10 independent trials
at each transmitter location were conducted to get similar results to the hardware
trials that were conducted. Only a limited number of independent hardware trials
were able to be accomplished for this research.
3.2

RSS Model for Simulation and Hardware
Table 3.1 is a collection of variables used in this research.
3.2.1

RF Signal Propagation.

The derivation begins with the model for

signal power. In free space, a RF signal will decay with respect to the distance
squared. In previous research [16] the model for received power in dB can be shown
to be:
ms (ds ) = P0 − η10 log10



ds
d0



(3.1)

where η is the path loss exponent and P0 is the reference received power at a known
reference distance d0 , typically 1m. This data has been collected for this research and
Figure 3.3 shows the data for Sun SPOT 7B20 from Equation (3.1). The effect of
noise in this log-normal model is assumed to be Gaussian with a standard deviation
of σ. The noise in this model is error due to log-normal fading, not interference
from jamming or other sources. The distance between the sensor and transmitter
in this model is defined by a two dimensional distance. The distance is defined by
ds = φs − θ , where [x0 , y0 ] = θ is the location of the transmitter and [xs , ys ] = φs is
the location of the sth sensor. Next, the received power is described by the locations
of the sensors and transmitters, ms (φs , θ̂) if the transmitter location is estimated or
20
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Figure 3.3: RSS vs. distance for Sun SPOT 7B20 showing Equation (3.1) with the
data from this Sun SPOT, where P0 = −10 and η = 2.1.
ms (φs , θ) for derivations where the transmitter location is known. Using this model,
the S × 1 received power vector, P , has a distribution of
P = m(φ, θ) + n

(3.2)

n ∼ N (0, σ 2 Is )

(3.3)

with Is being defined as an S × S identity matrix, where S is defined as the number
of sensors in the wireless network.
3.2.2

Data Creation and Variation.

For the hardware testing, these data

are collected and used in the estimation algorithm. To simulate the various scenarios,
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Variable
S
K
θ
θ̂
θ̂M L
φs
n
nsim
Ps
Γ0
P0
c0
P

P0j
d0
ds
ms (φ, θ)
m
P
IS , IT
ηb

Table 3.1: Table of variables used in this research
Definition
Dimensionality
Number of sensors
Scalar
# of independent trials
Scalar
Location of transmitter
1×2
Estimated location of transmitter 1 × 2
ML estimate of location of trans- 1 × 2
mitter
Location of sth sensor
1×2
Additive White Gaussian Noise S × 1
(AWGN)
AWGN generated by MATLAB
Scalar
th
Power received at s sensor in- Scalar
cluding AWGN
Power transmitted
Scalar
Logarithmic transmitted power
Scalar
Estimated transmitted power Scalar
from collected RSS
Logarithmic transmitted power of Scalar
Jammer
Reference distance
Scalar
Euclidean distance between emit- Scalar
ter and sth sensor
Received power at sth sensor Scalar
without noise present
Received power vector of all sen- S × 1
sors without noise present
Received power vector of all sen- S × 1
sors with AWGN
Identity matrix
S × S, T × T
Estimated η from collected RSS
Scalar
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Units
Unitless
Unitless
meters
meters
meters
meters
dBm
dBm
dBm
mW
dBm
dBm
dBm
meters
meters
dBm
dBm
dBm
Unitless
dBm

synthetic RSS values are needed. To create the RSS values, data are generated using
the models for the power and noise similar to what was used in [10]. To create the
RSS values, the location of the transmitter is used. The location of the transmitter is
only used to create the RSS values, not for the estimation algorithm. Using Equation
(3.1), ms (ds ) the ideal RSS value is calculated. Noise is then added to the ideal RSS
value with the modeled noise, nsim .
Ps = ms (ds ) + nsim,s

(3.4)

where nsim is AWGN generated by MATLAB. Following the method described in [10],
the noise is zero mean with unit variance, but is multiplied by the simulated variance,
σ. Data are created for each independent trial of the simulation. By changing the
standard deviation of the simulation, this varies the output of the simulation.
3.2.3

Transmitter Localization.

Using the system model and distribution

described above, a MLE can be made of the transmitter location θ. First, the Probability Density Function (PDF) is defined for the power of all the sensor observations
by
S
Y

−(Ps − m(φs , θ))2
1
√
p(P | θ) =
exp
2σ 2
2πσ
s=1

(3.5)

To find the MLE of θ, Equation (3.5) needs to be simplified. To simplify Equation
(3.5), the log-likelihood function, L, needs to be maximized. L is found by taking
the logarithm of the joint distribution and finding the value θ that maximizes the
likelihood function [13].
"

S
Y

−(Ps − m(φs , θ))2
1
√
L = ln[p(P | θ)] = ln
exp
2σ 2
2πσ
s=1

L = S · ln



1
√
2πσ



−

S
1 X
(Ps − m(φs , θ))2
2σ 2 s=1

b
θM L = arg max L
θ
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#

(3.6)

(3.7)
(3.8)

The first term of Equation (3.7) is a constant and does not affect θ. Next, to find the
values of θ that maximize L, the gradient with respect to θ is found and set equal to
0.



∇θ L = 0 = ∇θ S · ln



1
√
2πσ



S
− 2 P − m(φ, θ)
2σ

2



(3.9)

Solving Equation (3.9) gives the MLE of the position of the transmitter, b
θM L . This is
very difficult to solve analytically because there is no closed form solution. In order

to find the MLE, a numerical approach must be used. The MLE can be found by
combining and reducing Equations (3.7) and (3.8). The first term of Equation (3.7)
can be removed since it is a constant and will only affect the maximum value, not the
location of the maximum value.
b
θM L = arg min P − m(φ, θ)

2

θ

(3.10)

with θ being the possible transmitter location. Equation (3.10) is solved numerically
in MATLAB using a search grid algorithm.
3.2.4

Location Estimation in Simulation.

As mentioned previously, solving

analytically for the location is difficult. To find the MLE of the position for the
transmitter, a search grid is used in MATLAB. The search grid is defined to be 10 x
10 meters with 0.1 meter increments. The transmitter can be located at any location
in the search grid. To find the location each index of the matrix in MATLAB is
simulated as 0.1 meters to simulate the accuracy of the hardware set-up. At each
index the simulated RSS and Ps are used to calculate cost, C. The values are stored
in a matrix which is used to search for the minimum value which is b
θM L as defined

by Equation (3.10).

C = P − m(φ, θ)

2

(3.11)

Once the algorithm is completed and the matrix is full, a search for the minimum
value is conducted and the location is put into a vector b
θM L .
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3.2.5

Jammer in Simulation.

The jammer can be placed anywhere in the

search grid similar to how the transmitter can be placed anywhere in the search grid.
The effects of the jammer in the cooperative network simulations remove sensors
from the network within a certain distance from the jammer’s location. The jammer
can be either a directional or omni-directional antenna while the simulation is the
cooperative network. This is done by choosing the area of the receiver network that
will be affected by the jammer. Once the area is chosen, the sensors are removed
from the simulation. In the non-cooperative network simulations, the jammer acts
like another transmitter with a higher variable power that can be set independently
from the transmitter. In the case for the non-cooperative network, the jammer is
omni-directional.
3.2.6

Estimating for the Hardware Data Processing.

The data that is col-

lected from the Sun SPOT sensors are processed in MATLAB using the algorithm
described in this section. For the simulation the path loss η and the reference received
power P0 are set in MATLAB. For the data collection from the Sun SPOT sensors, η
and P0 are unknown and must be estimated using the collected RSS data. Using one
of the estimation algorithms from [16] and [19] this is accomplished.
The Sun SPOT network is a cooperative network, following the algorithm for the
standard RSS, η and P0 appear linearly in the RSS [19]. Unlike the position estimate
θ, η and P0 can be solved for analytically. Taking the gradient of L with respect to η
and P0 results in two equations that can be simplified into equation (3.12). From [16]
and [19] the MLE for η and P0 is



c0
P
ηb





=

1
ds (e
x0 , ye0 )

−1 

− ds (e
x0 , ye0 )
hp i
D 2
E  s 
− ds (e
x0 , ye0 )
ps d s

ds , 10 log10
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ds
d0



(3.12)

(3.13)

where ds is defined from the second half of Equation (3.1) and h·i denotes an average
over s. By performing the inverse and multiplying out the terms the estimates for P0
and η are
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ds (e
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x0 , ye0 ) ps ds (e
x0 , ye0 )
c0 =
D 2
E
P
2
ds (e
x0 , ye0 ) − ds (e
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ηb =

ds (e
x0 , ye0 ) hps i − ps ds (e
x0 , ye0 )
D 2
E
2
ds (e
x0 , ye0 ) − ds (e
x0 , ye0 )

(3.14)

(3.15)

c0 and ηb from the
These two Equations (3.14) and (3.15) are used for the estimates for P
RSS values collected during hardware testing. During each grid point in the search x
e0

and ye0 are assumed to be constant and used to solve Equations (3.14) and (3.15) for

c0 and ηb. The ML is evaluated using the parameters just solved for from Equations
P
(3.14) and (3.15). This process is repeated until all the grid points have been used. x
e0

and ye0 are chosen from the grid that minimize Equation (3.10) and the corresponding
c0 and ηb are retained.
P
3.3

Hardware Set-up

As stated in the system overview, there are four main components to the system:
• Cooperative or non-cooperative sensor network
• Basestation used for collecting and processing data
• Transmitter
• Jammer
The next four sub-sections describe the layout of the sensor network and the hardware
configuration for all parts of the system.
3.3.1

Sun SPOT Sensor Network.

The Sun SPOT units are configured in

a grid pattern allowing for the best possible coverage over a certain area. There are
two grid patterns used in this research; a four by four grid and a five by five grid

26

12
8
10
8
distance [m]

distance [m]

6

4

2

6
4
2

0
0
−2
−2

Jammer Direction

0

2
4
distance [m]

6

−2

8

(a)

Jammer Direction

0

5
distance [m]

10

(b)

Figure 3.4: (a) The first set-up is a four by four grid of Sun SPOT sensors containing
16 receivers designated by the symbol ∇. The transmitter can be located at the five
locations shown with the symbol ∗. The jammer is designated by the symbol ∇.
(b) The second set-up is a five by five grid of Sun SPOT sensors containing 25 receivers
designated by the symbol ∇. The transmitter can be located at the five locations
shown with the symbol ∗. The jammer is designated by the symbol ∇.
each with approximately 2.44 m (8 ft.) spacing between each pair of receivers. In
the real world the transmitter can be placed anywhere inside or outside the grid. For
this research the transmitter will be kept inside the grid and to designated locations
shown in Figure 3.4. The transmitter is moved from one location to the next and
data are collected at each location. The Sun SPOT units are attached to plastic poles
approximately 1 m off the ground as seen in Figure 3.5. The plastic poles allow the
Sun SPOTs to easily be configured and allow the transmitter to be moved easily.
3.3.2

Basestation and Transmitter.

All data from the sensor network is

reported back to a Sun SPOT unit configured as a basestation, plugged into the USB
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.5: (a) Sun SPOT sensor on the plastic pole used for data collection.
(b) Sun SPOT sensors on the plastic poles set-up in a grid for data collection.
port of a laptop. This entire set-up is called the basestation. The data from the
Sun SPOT receivers are collected with this basestation sensor and recorded on the
laptop using NetBeans. NetBeans is an open-source software program that is used for
developing desktop, mobile and web applications with Java and other programming
languages. Data can be passed on to MATLAB for real time processing of the position
solution or stored for later processing.
The transmitter is also a Sun SPOT unit configured as a transmitter. The
software program in NetBeans dictates what Sun SPOT will be a transmitter and
the rest of the Sun SPOTs will be receivers. This allows the Sun SPOTs to know
what the MAC address of the transmitter is and ignore any other device in the 2.4
GHz range. This is the key aspect of the cooperative network. In order to see the
effects of jamming in a cooperative network, the receivers will have to be blocked
from reading the RSS of the transmitter. This is done by having the jammer transmit
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Figure 3.6:

RFX2400 Daughterboard [8].

at a higher power in the same frequency band as the transmitter in order to disrupt
communications with the receiver.
3.3.3

USRP2 as a Jammer.

As mentioned earlier, the USRP2 is a SDR. A

SDR can be programmed to become almost any type of transmitter or receiver. The
USRP2 used for this research has the RFX2400 Daughterboard installed in it. The
RFX2400 has a frequency range from 2.3 to 2.9 GHz and a typical transmit power
of 50 mW. The RFX2400 has a band-pass filter around the 2400 to 2483 MHz ISM
band on the TXRX port The other port on the RFX2400 board, the RX2 port, is
unfiltered allowing for coverage of the entire frequency range without attenuation [8].
The TXRX port is the only transmitter port on the RFX2400 board. TXRX port
can also be set up to receive signals, while the RX2 port can only be set up to receive
signals. Figure shows the RFX2400 daughterboard.
The USRP2 is used as a noise jammer for this research. The USRP2 is controlled
with Simulink version 7.7 from MATLAB 2011a. Simulink has two blocks that work
with the USRP2; the USRP2 Transmitter and USRP2 Receiver block. The USRP2
Transmitter block enables communication with a USRP2 board on the same Ethernet
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Figure 3.7:

Front view of a USRP2.

subnetwork. This block accepts a column vector input signal from Simulink and
transmits signal and control data to a USRP2 board using User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) packets. Although the USRP2 Transmitter block sends data to a USRP2
board, the block acts as a Simulink sink [28]. This allows the user to create numerous
types of signals and waveforms and send them to the USRP2. For this research,
Gaussian noise is added to a complex sine wave and sent to the USRP2. The center
frequency, gain and interpolation can be set under the USRP2 Transmitter block
properties. This allows for easy change in-between test scenarios.
The USRP2 Receiver block, similar to the USRP2 Transmitter block, also enables communication with a USRP2. This block receives signal and control data from
a USRP2 board using UDP packets. Although the USRP2 Receiver block receives
data from a USRP2 board, the block acts as a Simulink source that outputs a column
vector signal of fixed length [28]. The center frequency, gain and decimation can be
set under the USRP2 Receiver block properties.
For this research to control the power of the jammer, the amplitude of the
complex sine wave is adjusted. To adjust the amplitude of the sine wave, the number
required is entered in the amplitude box in the sine wave block parameters. The
amount of Gaussian noise can also be adjusted by changing the mean value and
variance values in the block parameter for the Gaussian Noise Generator. Figure
3.8 shows a block diagram of how the USRP2 is configured and all the components
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Figure 3.8:
jammer.

Block diagram showing the hardware configuration for the USRP2

required to operate as a jammer. Figure 3.9 shows the Simulink block diagram of the
components and how they interact to create the noise jammer.
There are three different types of antennas used for this research.
• 3 dBi gain omni-directional antenna
• Log Periodic Printed Circuit Board Antenna 900 - 2600 MHz by Kent Electronics
• Hawking HiGain 90◦ Directional Corner Antenna with 15dBi of gain
These antennas are used to test the ability of the jammer with various amounts of
directionality and gain. In each scenario, the antenna is set up along the edge of
the sensor network. The directional antennas are set up in the same configuration to
test the effects of the antennas. Figure 3.10 shows the antennas, Figure 3.11 shows
the gain vs. frequency for the log periodic antenna, Figure 3.12 shows the antenna
pattern of the Hawking HiGain Directional Corner Antenna and Figure 3.13 shows
the different configurations for the antenna layout of the test.
The directional antenna is used to focus the energy from the jammer and knock
out only certain portions of the sensor network. This gives the user more control
over the area of the sensor network that will be jammed. The directional antenna is
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Figure 3.9:
mer.

Simulink diagram showing the configuration for the USRP2 noise jam-

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.10: (a) Hawking HiGain Directional Corner Antenna, 2.4 - 2.4835 GHz.
(b) Kent Electronics, WA5VJB, 900 - 2600 MHz log periodic antenna.
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Figure 3.11:

Figure 3.12:
[12].

The gain of the log periodic antenna vs. frequency [14].

The gain pattern of the Hawking HiGain Directional Corner Antenna
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Figure 3.13: (a) Jammer in a four by four network of Sun SPOT sensors
(b) Jammer in a five by five network of Sun SPOT sensors.
also designed specifically for the 2.4GHz ISM band which should allow the jammer
to operate more efficiently than the other antennas used in this research. Using a
Wi-Spy spectrum analyzer, a view of the RF environment before jamming is shown in
Figure 3.14 and a view of the RF environment with the jammer on using the HiGain
antenna is shown in Figure 3.15. To get a sense of what the jammer is jamming,
Figure 3.16 shows what the RF spectrum of the Sun SPOTs look like.
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Figure 3.14:

The RF environment outside with nothing on.

Figure 3.15:
The RF environment outside with the jammer using the Hawking
◦
HiGain 90 Directional Corner Antenna.

Figure 3.16: The RF environment outside with 16 Sun SPOT sensors on. The SUN
SPOTs spectrum is centered around 2.48 GHz.
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IV. Results and Analysis

T

his chapter details results from the simulations and hardware testing described
in Chapter 3. Section 4.1 describes the simulation and hardware parameters

used for this research. Section 4.2 illustrates the results for geolocation when used
in a non-jamming environment. Section 4.3 discusses the simulation results for jamming the cooperative and non-cooperative sensor networks. Section 4.4 discusses the
hardware results for jamming the cooperative and non-cooperative sensor networks.
Section 4.5 discusses the results of the comparison between non-jamming, jamming,
simulation and hardware. Section 4.6 discusses the results of jamming the basestation
used to collect the data from the Sun SPOTs.
4.1

Simulation and Hardware Parameters
Table 4.1 shows the parameters used for the various test and simulations. Figure

4.1 gives an overview of the five possible transmitter locations that are used in this
research. These locations will be referred to when discussing transmitter locations in
this chapter.
4.2

Non-Jamming Geolocation Results
This section covers the performance of the geolocation algorithm in simulation

and hardware collection in non-jamming environments. The purpose of this section is
to give a baseline to compare the results of the jamming simulations and test against.
The non-jamming tests give an idea of how the Sun SPOT sensors behave in a normal
outside environment. First the results of the simulations are shown in Figures 4.2 and
4.3.
The results from hardware testing with the Sun SPOT sensors are displayed
next. For hardware testing, data from the Sun SPOT sensors were collected and stored
on the basestation laptop. For each transmitter location 400 to 1000 data points were
used to average the RSS data collected. Figure 4.4 shows transmitter location one in
the four by four network of Sun SPOT receivers. As discussed in Chapter III, η and
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Table 4.1: Table of parameters used in this research
Figure # of Sen- # of Indepen- P0 [dBm]
P0j [dBm]
sors (S)
dent trials (K)
4.1
16
N/A
N/A
N/A
4.2
16
10
-7
N/A
4.3
25
10
-7
N/A
4.4
16
1
-5.3
N/A
4.5
16
1
-16.3 to 5
N/A
4.6
16
10
-7
3
4.7
16
10
-7
3
4.8
16
10
-7
3
4.9
16
10
-7
3
4.10
16
10
-7
-4
4.11
16
10
-7
-4
4.12
25
1
-14.8
5
4.13
25
1
-14.8 to 6.2 5
4.14
16
1
-6.2
5
4.15
16
3
-6.2 to 5.4 5
4.16
16
1
-16.5
5
4.17
16
1
-16.5 to 2.8 5
4.18
16
2
-24.4 to 4.9 5
4.19
16
3
-6.2 to 5.4 5
4.20
16
2
-24.4 to 4.9 5
4.21
25
1
-14.8 to 6.2 5
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Figure 4.1: Showing the five possible transmitter locations in the receiver network
used for simulation and hardware testing.
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Figure 4.2: Non-jamming results simulated in a four by four grid of sensors. Showing five possible transmitter locations and five different simulations with the CRLB
in cyan solid line and the Covariance in magenta dashed line of the estimate for the
10 trials simulated, with η = 2 and σnoise = 6.
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Figure 4.3: Non-jamming results simulated in a five by five grid of sensors. Showing
five possible transmitter locations and five different simulations with the CRLB in
cyan solid line and the Covariance in magenta dashed line of the estimate for the 10
trials simulated, with η = 2 and σnoise = 6.
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P0 are estimated from the collected RSS values. To get statically accurate results,
the non-jamming scenario was conducted K multiple times and averaged over each
independent trial. The contours in Figure 4.4 are of C from Equation (3.11). The
contours are shown to graphically represent the values calculated in the search grid to
see the minimum value representing the estimated location of the transmitter. Figure
4.5 shows the individual trials and estimated location over the total number of trials
for each of the five transmitter locations. The figures show that the hardware results
are very similar to the simulation results. This validates the simulation and shows
that the geolocation algorithm is working properly. This is important to know before
the jamming results can be compared with the non-jamming results.
4.3

Jamming Sensor Networks in Simulation
This section will cover the performance of the geolocation algorithm in simula-

tion against jamming environments. The purpose of this section is to give simulation
data to compare with the hardware jamming test. As described earlier there are two
types of sensor networks that were simulated; a cooperative sensor network and a
non-cooperative sensor network. The affects of jamming each type of sensor network
are slightly different. The data in this section shows the results of jamming on both
types of networks.
The cooperative network is shown is Figure 4.6 and shows a simulated directional
jammer. The jammer is pointed up the row of sensors on the left of the sensor network
to simulate the effects of the directional hardware jammer. Figure 4.7 shows all five
transmitter locations each with 10 trials. As the figure shows, the two locations that
were in the path of the jammer have the worst estimates for the transmitter’s location.
In a cooperative network when the sensors are jammed, they do not report back to
the basestation. The results of this simulation indicate that when the sensors around
the transmitter are jammed, the estimation performance is reduced.
This can also be seen when an omni-directional antenna is simulated in MATLAB. The results shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 are similar to the results from the
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Figure 4.4:
Non-jamming results from hardware testing Sun SPOTs in a four by
four grid of sensors. Only one trial at one transmitter location is shown.
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transmitters locations are shown.
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directional antenna. The transmitter’s location estimate in the area where the sensors are jammed is not as accurate as the transmitters that are surrounded by sensors.
This data shows that in a cooperative sensor network the jamming effect is localized
to the area where the sensors are jammed. More data on this is shown in Section 4.4.

Unlike the cooperative sensor network, in the non-cooperative sensor network,
the receivers do not know the MAC address or modulation of the transmitter. The
jamming results are discussed next in this section. Unlike the cooperative network,
the jamming effects are not as localized in a non-cooperative network. Figure 4.10
demonstrates the effects of jamming a non-cooperative sensor network on one transmitter location. The jammer in this simulation and all the non-cooperative network
simulations is an omni-directional jammer. Figure 4.11 shows the results for the five
different transmitter locations. For each of the five transmitter locations, the jammer
affected the receivers differently. For this reason, the figure does not show which receivers had > 50% power from the jammer. For each transmitter location, different
receivers were affected. As the results show, all five transmitter location estimates
were affected by the jammer. Since the jammer has approximately three dB more
power than the transmitter, the jamming results moved the estimation closer to the
jammers location. Higher power levels for the jammer were simulated, but the results
of the estimated position for the transmitter at the various locations were all near
the jammer. This is due to the fact that the receivers thought the jammer was the
transmitter since most of the power was coming from the jammer.
4.4

Jamming Sun SPOT Sensor with Hardware
This section will cover the performance of the geolocation algorithm in a jam-

ming environment using Sun SPOT sensors and the USRP2 as a jammer. There are
three different antennas used for the hardware testing as discussed in Chapter III.
The first antenna used is a 3 dB gain omni-directional antenna. This antenna was
used to jam a five by five grid of Sun SPOTs. Figure 4.12 shows the effects the
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Figure 4.6: Jamming results from MATLAB simulation of a directional antenna in
a four by four grid of cooperative network sensors. The average estimated position
over 10 trials at transmitter location one is shown with the CRLB in cyan solid line
and the Covariance in magenta dashed line, with η = 2 and σnoise = 6.
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omni-directional jammer had on the Sun SPOT network for the transmitter located
at location 1 near the jammer. Figure 4.13 shows the effects the omni-directional
jammer had on the Sun SPOT network for all five transmitter locations. The estimated position near the transmitter at location 1 is actually the estimated position
for the transmitter at location 4. Some of the Sun SPOTS were not reporting which
is why there are some shown as jammed even though they are not near the jammer.
The effects of jamming the Sun SPOT sensors are very similar to the simulations
done with MATLAB. Most of the error is where the Sun SPOTS are jammed around
a transmitter. The one anomaly is the bottom right estimation is not accurate even
though the Sun SPOTs were not jammed around the transmitter.
Another antenna tested is the Kent Electronics, WA5VJB, 900 - 2600 MHz log
periodic antenna. This antenna was used to direct the energy of the jammer like a
directional antenna. The antenna is not designed specifically for the 2.4 GHz band
and did not have a high gain pattern. The results in Figure 4.14 show that the Sun
SPOT receivers near the jammer were jammed. The Sun SPOT receivers on the top
row were not reporting during the time of jamming the transmitter at this location
and were not jammed by the jammer. These results are from one test and are not
averaged over a number of trials. In Figure 4.15, the results are averaged over three
jamming trials conducted with different Sun SPOT configurations on three different
days. The results for the transmitter at location 1 look like they are accurate, but
they are averaged from an estimated location below and two estimated locations above
the transmitter. The three independent trials can also be seen in Figure 4.15. No
jammed Sun SPOT receivers are shown in the figure since each independent trial had
a different amount of Sun SPOT receivers jammed. Three trials are not enough to
get a good average for the jammed location estimation.
The third antenna used for jamming the Sun SPOT Receivers is the Hawking
HiGain Directional Corner Antenna with 15 dB of gain and a 90◦ beam width. This
antenna had a larger effect than the other antennas. The same amount of power from
the USRP2 went into the antenna. Figure 4.16 shows the results for the jamming
51

12
10

distance [m]

8
6
4
2
0
−2

0

2

4
6
8
distance [m]

10

12

Contours of C from (3.11)
Actual Tx
Estimated Tx
Sun SPOT Receivers
Jammed Sun SPOT Receivers
Non−reporting Sun SPOT Receivers
Jammer
Figure 4.12:
Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and an
omni-directional antenna in a five by five grid of Sun SPOT receivers at location one.
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scenario where the jammer is pointed down the row of Sun SPOT receivers and the
transmitter is at location 1. Since the antenna is designed for the 2.4 GHz spectrum
and is a directional antenna, the effects were dramatic. Most of the Sun SPOT
receivers in the 90◦ beam width were jammed. Figure 4.17 shows the estimated
position for all five transmitter locations. The only location that was not affected by
the jammer is the transmitter at location 4. This is due to the fact that there were
still receivers around that transmitter. Figure 4.18 shows the estimated position for
all five transmitter locations averaged over two trials. The results are similar and
shows that all the receivers in the 90◦ beam width were jammed. The results from
the directional antenna show that with the same transmit power the jammer can be
more efficient depending on what antenna is used.
4.5

Comparison between Jamming and Non-Jamming
This section compares the difference between jamming and non-jamming geolo-

cation performance. Table 4.2 shows the comparison on the difference between the
non-jamming and jamming results using the log periodic antenna. This table also
shows how far off the jamming and clear air collection is from the reference transmitter location. Figure 4.19 shows the results of jamming with a log periodic antenna
averaged over three trials. The estimation for transmitter one seems accurate, but
the individual trials were below and above the actual location. The average happened to be in the correct spot. Transmitter location two shows that the jammed
estimation is not as accurate as the clear air estimation. Each individual trial shows
that the jamming has an effect on the geolocation solution. If more trials were conducted, there would be a better statistical accuracy to compare the jamming against
the non-jamming results.
Next the results for the directional antenna are shown in Figure 4.20. As the
figure shows, the jamming effects for the directional antenna are obvious compared
to the log periodic antenna. The directional antenna has a higher gain and narrower
beam width focusing the same power from the jammer more efficiently than the log
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Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and a
HiGain directional antenna in a four by four grid of Sun SPOT receivers showing the
estimated location for the transmitter at location 2.

57

10
8

distance [m]

6
4
2
0
−2
−2

0

2

4
6
distance [m]

8

10

Actual Tx
Estimated Tx
Sun SPOT Receivers
Jammed Sun SPOT Receivers
Jammer
Figure 4.17:
Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and a
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Figure 4.18:
Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and a
HiGain directional antenna in a four by four grid of Sun SPOT receivers showing all
five transmitter locations averaged over two trials.
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Tx Location

Table 4.2: Data for
Clear Air Jamming
Error from Error from
Reference
Reference

Tx
Tx
Tx
Tx
Tx

0.28
0.64
1.20
0.49
0.35

1
2
3
4
5

m
m
m
m
m

0.46
2.00
1.41
0.86
0.63

m
m
m
m
m

the log periodic jammer
Jamming
RMSE in
Error from X direction
Clear Air
Results
0.35 m
0.71 m
1.64 m
2.24 m
0.21 m
1.10 m
0.45 m
0.95 m
0.51 m
0.39 m

RMSE in
Y direction

1.75
2.58
2.61
0.25
1.42

m
m
m
m
m

periodic antenna. Table 4.3 gives the numerical results shown in Figure 4.20. The
data shows that the transmitters in the beam width of the jammer were affected while
the transmitter outside the beam width was not affected. Even though there is only
one jamming trial, the effects of the jamming are easily seen. More trials would be
required to get a good statistical comparison between the jamming and non-jamming.
In Figure 4.21, there is only one jamming trial and one non-jamming trial.
Table 4.4 gives the numerical results for the five by five grid shown in Figure 4.21.
There are not enough trials of non-jamming or jamming to get a good statistical
comparison. The results do show that the jamming solution is not as accurate as the
non-jamming solution. Another issue with the five by five grid of Sun SPOT sensors
is that the Sun SPOTs randomly kept going out in the clear air data collection along
with the jamming collection. This did not happen with the four by four grid of Sun
SPOTs. An older and different version of the software controlling the Sun SPOTs was
used for the four by four grid. This version of the control software was more stable
but was limited to 16 Sun SPOT receivers. More trials were planned for the five by
five grid, but this issue was not resolved and a good statistical data set would not
have been able to be collected.
Table 4.5 gives the percentages of the difference between the jamming and clear
air results for all three antenna types. As the data shows, the HiGain Directional
antenna had the largest impact on the estimation performance of the Sun SPOT
WSN. For example, at location 1 the jammer using the HiGain Directional antenna
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Tx Location

Table 4.3: Data for
Clear Air Jamming
Error from Error from
Reference
Reference

Tx
Tx
Tx
Tx
Tx

0.28
0.64
1.20
0.49
0.35

1
2
3
4
5

Tx Location

Tx
Tx
Tx
Tx
Tx

1
2
3
4
5

m
m
m
m
m

2.48
3.99
4.22
0.10
2.23

m
m
m
m
m

the directional jammer
Jamming
RMSE in
Error from X direction
Clear Air
Results
2.37 m
2.50 m
4.49 m
3.17 m
3.57 m
3.90 m
0.41 m
0.44 m
2.56 m
2.00 m

Table 4.4: Data for the omni-directional jammer
Clear Air Jamming
Jamming
RMSE in
Error from Error from Error from X direction
Reference
Reference
Clear Air
Results
2.37 m
4.91 m
7.27 m
1.48 m
1.59 m
8.61 m
7.03 m
7.88 m
0.78 m
0.87 m
0.99 m
0.07 m
3.59 m
6.84 m
10.33 m
6.83 m
0.34 m
0.45 m
0.22 m
0.12 m
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RMSE in
Y direction

0.08
3.03
3.50
0.42
1.79

m
m
m
m
m

RMSE in
Y direction

4.68
3.47
0.87
0.12
0.43

m
m
m
m
m
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Figure 4.19: Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and a log
periodic antenna in a four by four grid of Sun SPOT receivers averaged over three
trials compared to non-jamming results.
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Figure 4.20:
Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and a
HiGain directional antenna in a four by four grid of Sun SPOT receivers averaged
over two trials compared to non-jamming results.
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Figure 4.21:
Jamming results from hardware jamming with the USRP2 and a
omni-directional antenna in a five by five grid of Sun SPOT receivers compared to
non-jamming results.
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Table 4.5: Jamming estimation
Tx Location
% Error from
Non-jamming
using
Directional
Tx 1
795%
Tx 2
519%
Tx 3
252%
Tx 4
-80%
Tx 5
542%

difference compared to non-jamming
% Error from % Error from
Non-jamming
Non-jamming
using Log Peri- usign
Omniodic
directional
64%
108%
210%
443%
17%
11%
76%
91%
82%
32%

had approximately 795% or 8 times worse estimation than the clear air estimation.
This data shows that the more efficient and effective jammer combination is using
the HiGain Directional antenna. The HiGain Directional antenna produced a less
accurate estimation which leades to a greater percent estimation error. The exception
is location four with approximately an 80% better estimation than the non-jamming
test. This is due to the fact that there were only a limited number of trials conducted
and that location four was not affected by the jammer. Also, the estimation happened
to be almost exactly on the correct location for the transmitter.
The performance increase of the HiGain Directional antenna over the log periodic antenna is significant. For transmitter location one, the performance increase
is approximately 11 times greater than the log periodic antenna. Table 4.6 gives the
data for all five transmitter locations and the average performance increase excluding
transmitter location 4. The data shows that in all but one location the HiGain Directional antenna performed better than the log periodic antenna. This is due to the
fact that the HiGain antenna is designed specifically for the 2.4 GHz ISM band and
has larger gain than the other antennas. The reason the estimation for transmitter
location 4 was less accurate for the log periodic antenna is mainly due to the number
of trials conducted. If there were a sufficient number of hardware trials conducted,
the results should be similar for transmitter location 4.

65

Table 4.6:

4.6

Performance increase of the HiGain antenna over the log periodic antenna
Tx Location
Performance increase
over log periodic antenna
Tx 1
1136%
Tx 2
147%
Tx 3
1352%
Tx 4
-206%
Tx 5
564%
Average
800%

Basestation Results
The basestation is the Sun SPOT unit connected to the laptop through a USB

cable. This specially configured Sun SPOT unit collects all the reports from the Sun
SPOT receivers and stores them in a data file on the laptop. This one Sun SPOT
unit is the device which communicates with all of the Sun SPOT receivers and if the
connection is disrupted, no data will be collected from the network. This fact was
observed the first time the USRP2 was tested as a jammer on the Sun SPOTs. The
jammer was approximately two meters from the Sun SPOT basestation connected
to the laptop collecting the data from the Sun SPOT receivers. Within a second of
the jammer being turned on all the reports from the receivers stopped and it was
determined the jammer blocked the signals from reaching the Sun SPOT used as a
basestation. In order to test the jammer with the sensor network, the laptop and Sun
SPOT basestation were moved to the other side of the WSN opposite the jammer,
approximately 12 meters away from the jammer. This allowed testing to resume and
data was able to be collected.
The jamming of the basestation showed a weakness in the Sun SPOT WSN
that was not considered in this research before hardware testing began. This result
showed another way to disrupt a WSN using less energy and more efficient jamming.
Depending on what the end results of jamming are determined to be, either reducing
the accuracy of the estimation or blocking the estimation, jamming the basestation
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can stop the geolocation estimation and result in no data collected. This can be a
more efficient way of jamming a WSN if the user just wants to block the geolocation
estimation from occurring. The results from this test concluded that within a matter
of seconds, the data from the entire Sun SPOT network can be blocked while the
jammer is within close proximity to the Sun SPOT basestation. This can be very
challenging since an attacker would have to know where the basestation collecting the
data from the WSN is located. This method of jamming would be difficult for an
attacker to perform.
Another observation relating to the basestation is that when the jammer is
turned on the report rate from the receivers reduces dramatically. The number of
reports that the basestation receives per second is reduced. In order to achieve the
same number of reports per transmitter location as the non-jamming results, it took
at least twice as long. The amount of reports per second and the multi-hop of the
data across the Sun SPOT receivers should be researched in the future.
Due to some software control issues with the USRP2 with Simulink, the jammer
was intermittent. At first the jammer was working and then unexpectedly the jammer
stopped working. A few weeks later the jammer began to work again. No changes were
made to the control software and there was no explanation on what fixed the issues
happening in the preceding weeks. After a couple of months testing the jammer
stopped working again for no explained reason. There was trouble with Simulink
compiling the code to the USRP2. Once that issue was resolved, the jammer still
would not operate. Because of these issues there was a lack of data collection after
the jammer stopped working in November. If these issues had not happened more
data would have been collected to get better statistical results for comparison.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work

T

his Section details conclusions that were drawn from the results of this research. Future research project possibilities are also presented here based on

the research outlined in Chapter III and Chapter IV.
5.1

Summary
The goal of this research is to determine the effects of jamming on Sun SPOT

sensors used in a sensor network for geolocation. The sensor network was first simulated in MATLAB to get an idea of how the Sun SPOTs would respond to jamming.
A cooperative WSN and a non-cooperative WSN were simulated to see the effects
on the two different types of networks. After the networks were simulated, a jammer was introduced into the simulation. A number of jamming trials were conducted
and the data was processed using the geolocation estimation algorithm outlined in
Chapter III. This data was used to help create the set-up for the hardware jamming
experiments.
The next step of the research was to develop and create a simple noise jammer using a USRP2. The USRP2 was controlled using Simulink from MATLAB
2011a. This control was new and there were issues with the software interface through
Simulink to the USRP2. Support for the USRP2 has changed in the latest version
of MATLAB 2011b. Special software from MathWorks needs to be downloaded and
installed for the USRP2 to communicate in Simulink. The RFX2400 daughterboard
has not been tested in the latest version of Simulink and may not work according to
MathWorks. The jammer did work for a time and data was collected on 10 different
days over four months before the jammer stopped working. After the data was collected, the data was processed through the geolocation algorithms using MATLAB.
From this the estimates were compared to non-jamming results and the reference
location for the transmitters.
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5.2

Conclusions
First the hardware results show that jamming does have an effect on geolocation

estimation produced by the Sun SPOT sensors similar to the results in the simulations.
The MATLAB simulations gave an expected outcome on how the Sun SPOT sensors
would react in a jamming environment and provided a baseline to compare the results
with. The hardware results showed that by jamming the Sun SPOT receivers near the
transmitter, the estimation accuracy of the transmitter’s location was reduced by up
to 795% or 8 times depending on the antenna used. The results also showed that the
effects were localized to the area affected by the jammer which varied depending on the
antenna used. To disrupt a cooperative WSN like the Sun SPOTs, the jammer would
have to be very powerful, very close to the WSN or just powerful enough to block
the basestation. For the non-cooperative network, the simulation results showed that
the effects of jamming were not localized and that all the transmitter locations were
affected by the jammer. Also as the power of the jammer increased, the estimation
for the transmitters location moved toward the location of the jammer.
One area of interest discovered during testing was the type of antenna made a
huge difference in the performance of the jammer. All three of the antennas used were
designed to operate in the 2.4 GHz spectrum, but only one was designed specifically
for the ISM band of the 2.4 GHz spectrum. The Hawking HiGain Directional Corner
Antenna with 15 dB of gain and a 90◦ beam width performed better than the other
two antennas. The HiGain antenna performed approximately 8 times better than
the log periodic antenna, excluding transmitter location 4, which resulted in a less
accurate estimation for the transmitter. The HiGain antenna had the same amount
of transmit power from the USRP2 as the other antennas, but was more efficient in
focusing the power out of the antenna. This allowed the USRP2 acting as a noise
jammer to disrupt more Sun SPOT receivers in the path of the HiGain antenna. This
shows that the antenna used for the jammer has a major impact on the efficiency and
lethality of the jammer. If power is a consideration, a more efficient antenna will help
offset the lower power coming from the jammer.
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Another observation from this research is that the type of WSN has an effect on
the results from jamming. When compared to a non-cooperative WSN, a cooperative
WSN is protected more from jamming since the sensors are able to communicate with
each other and communicate with the transmitter. In this type of WSN the effects
of jamming are localized based on the location of the jammer and the beam width of
the antenna used for jamming. In a non-cooperative WSN the effects of jamming are
greater than in the cooperative WSN because the transmitter is not communicating
with the receivers in the WSN. Since the transmitter is not part of the network, when
the jammer is transmitting, the receivers in the WSN mistake the jammer as another
transmitter. The results of jamming in a non-cooperative WSN are not localized and
affect the transmitter at all possible locations in the non-cooperative WSN.
5.3

Future Work
There are a few areas of this research that should be explored further. The first

area is changing the control software from Simulink to GNU Radio software and its
newer graphical interface GRC. Simulink has some control and programming issues
that affected the amount of experimental results that were available for this research.
Using GNU Radio should allow the USRP2 to be a more diverse and capable jammer.
Another area to explore is using two or more USRP2 radios connected together
by using the Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) port on the USRP2’s. This
will allow the user to expand the jammers bandwidth and create diverse signals using
multiple USRP2 radios with up to eight antennas. Along with MIMO a reactive
jammer should be considered as the next step in this research. Having a jammer
that could detect a signal and then start jamming would make the jammer a more
efficient device. Other types of jammers would also be beneficial to look into. A
random jammer would be harder to detect and could give different results than the
other types of jammers.
A hardware test for a non-cooperative WSN would be the next step in testing
the USRP2 jammer. The testing of the USRP2 jammer in this research used Sun
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SPOT sensors that communicated with each other as a cooperative WSN. Getting
data from a non-cooperative WSN would be beneficial and allow comparison with the
simulations that were conducted for a non-cooperative WSN.
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